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Abstract
Background: In vitro fertilization (IVF) and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) are becoming increasingly
common techniques to select embryos that are unaffected by a known genetic disorder. Though IVF-PGD has high
success rates, 7.5 % of blastocysts have inconclusive results after testing. A recent case involving a known BRCA-1
carrier was brought before our Assisted Reproductive Technology Ethics Committee in order to gain a better
appreciation for the ethical implications surrounding the transfer of embryos with indeterminate testing.
The case presentation: Thirty-nine year old G0 BRCA-1 carrier requiring IVF for male factor infertility. The couple
elected for PGD to select against BRCA-1 gene carrier embryos. However, several embryos were returned with
inconclusive results. The couple wished to proceed with the transfer of embryos with an unknown carrier status.
The case was presented before our Assisted Reproductive Technology Ethics Committee.
Conclusion: Many considerations were explored, including the physician's duty to protect patient autonomy, the
physician's duty to act in the best interest of the future child, and the physician's duty towards society. Transferring
both embryos with unknown carrier status and known-carrier status was debated. Ultimately, the transfer of
inconclusive embryos was felt to be ethically permissible in most cases if patients had been adequately counseled.
However, the re-biopsy of embryos with inconclusive testing results was encouraged. The transfer of known-carrier
embryos was felt to be unethical for certain disease-states, depending on the severity of illness and timing of
disease onset. We strongly encourage physicians to create an action plan in advance with their patients, prior to
testing, in the event that embryos are returned with inconclusive PGD results. The committee’s decision, though
helpful in guiding practice, should not overshadow the individual physician-patient relationship, and the need for
thorough counseling.
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Background
In vitro fertilization (IVF) and pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD) are becoming increasingly common
techniques to select embryos that are unaffected by a
known genetic disorder. Couples may opt for PGD if
they are carriers of the gene for Tay-Sachs or Huntington’s
disease, for example, conditions with well-understood and
predictable patterns of inheritance. PGD is also increas-
ingly desired by patients with hereditary cancer syn-
dromes. A recent meta-analysis of 13 studies which
included 370 respondents affected by a hereditary cancer
syndrome, reported that 28 % felt their syndrome
impacted family planning, 72 % felt that PGD should be
offered, and 43 % would consider using PGD [1]. Accept-
ance of PGD has been well-studied in patients specifically
affected by hereditary breast and ovarian cancer (HBOC)
as well [2]. In a survey of 22 couples affected by HBOC,
half chose to undergo PGD because they “believed it was
their moral duty to protect their future child(ren) from
suffering” [3].
PGD, however, is an imperfect science, and does not
always provide conclusive results [4, 5]. Though published
data report that misdiagnosis is rare, with rates of <1 %
for polymerase chain reaction (PCR) cases and <5 % for
fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH) cases, some stud-
ies suggest that misdiagnoses may be underestimated or
underreported [6]. Approximately 7.5 % of blastocysts
have inconclusive results after testing [7]. Indeterminate
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results in PGD, and the development of pregnancies
affected by a genetic disorder that failed to be detected,
can have long-lasting and devastating effects.
When testing is indeterminate, the IVF team is con-
fronted with several ethical considerations regarding
whether or not to proceed with embryo transfer. Many
perspectives must be weighed under these circum-
stances. Employing the founding principles of bioethics,
as laid out by Beauchamp and Childress, are effective
means of clarifying the ethical stakes involved [8]. These
include considering the patient’s right to autonomy,
particularly reproductive autonomy, the physician’s re-
sponsibility of beneficence towards her patient, the
physician’s duty of non-maleficence regarding the unborn
child he or she is helping to create, and the implications
for society at large, a broader question hinging on the
principle of justice. A recent case at our institution, pre-
sented below, compelled us to examine these consider-
ations in greater depth.
Case presentation
In the following case, all potential patient information
was de-identified, consent was not necessary or re-
quested, and the case was exempt from IRB approval.
Patient S was a 39-year-old Gravida 0 and was a known
BRCA-1 gene carrier, status post prophylactic bilateral
mastectomy. After trying to conceive for over a year, she
and her husband underwent an infertility evaluation,
which revealed severe male factor infertility, prompting
them to pursue IVF and consider PGD.
BRCA-1 mutations have autosomal dominant inherit-
ance. Women who carry the gene have a 57 % lifetime risk
of developing breast cancer and 40 % risk of developing
ovarian cancer by the age of 70 [9]. Male BRCA-1 carriers
have a lifetime breast cancer risk of less than 2 %, but may
be twice as likely to develop prostate cancer before age 65,
and this may be aggressive and be associated with poorer
survival when compared to the general population [10].
Diligent screening practices, and prophylactic surgeries in
known carriers, reduce but do not eliminate these risks.
Having already undergone prophylactic bilateral mastec-
tomy, our patient planned to undergo a risk reducing
prophylactic bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy at age 40.
Given her BRCA-1 status, and the indication for
assisted reproductive technology to treat her infertility,
the patient and her husband opted to undergo IVF/ ICSI
(intracytoplasmic sperm injection) and PGD to select
non-carrier embryos for BRCA-1, and wished to transfer
two unaffected embryos. Pre-implantation genetic screen-
ing for chromosome evaluation was offered but was not
covered by her insurance, and the couple deferred this
testing. As with all routine obstetric care, post-conception
genetic screening and confirmatory testing would be
offered should the couple so choose.
The IVF/ICSI cycle resulted in 17 oocytes retrieved
and 10 fertilized. Of those, 5 day 5 blastocysts under-
went biopsy and PGD with the following results: one af-
fected embryo, one unaffected embryo, one embryo with
no results (no DNA amplification), and two embryos
with inconclusive test results. The embryos with incon-
clusive results were Grade 5 BC (blastocysts with poor
trophectoderm cells). Data suggest that twice-frozen em-
bryos have statistically significant lower post-thaw sur-
vival rates compared to once-frozen embryos (87.5 % vs
98.3 %) but have equivalent pregnancy and live birth
rates [11, 12]. Generating an inconclusive result is an in-
trinsic risk in PGD. A 2013 study estimated that for
blastocyst biopsy, cryopreservation and thawed embryo
transfer, the diagnostic rate is 90 % with 5 % amplifica-
tion failure and 5 % allele drop-out [4].
Despite the frustrating outcome of the cycle, the deci-
sion was made to proceed with the transfer of the one
unaffected embryo. The patient, however, expressed a
strong desire to transfer the embryos with inconclusive
results if the initial transfer was unsuccessful, and de-
clined re-biopsying the embryos.
Currently, there exist no overarching guidelines dictat-
ing what a physician should do regarding embryos with
inconclusive results. As initially the patient opted for
PGD in order to avoid transmission of the BRCA-1 gene
to her future child, it seems inconsistent to then transfer
an embryo with an unknown genotype that has a 50 %
chance of being a carrier. It is difficult to predict the in-
dividual likelihood of developing a future malignancy, as
the BRCA-1 gene displays incomplete penetrance. While
many infertility specialists agree there is a professional
“obligation to not (deliberately) transfer an affected em-
bryo,” there is no consensus regarding embryos with
indeterminate carrier status [13]. The European Society
of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) com-
ments that physicians, as “collaborators in the parental
project” ought to refuse transfer of an embryo that may be
affected by a condition that poses a “high risk of serious
harm to the future child.” The ESHRE, however, offers no
concrete definition of the term “serious harm” [14].
The patient’s request to transfer an embryo with
inconclusive testing raises the question of where the
physician’s primary responsibility lies. The physician has
a Hippocratic duty to his or her patient and to protect-
ing that patient’s reproductive autonomy, but there are
conflicting duties that complicate the decision-making
process. The physician must consider his or her duty
towards the future child, and potentially his or her
responsibilities towards society in general. Is it a poor
and inappropriate allocation of societal resources to assist
in the creation of an adult at high risk of requiring exten-
sive financial and/or psychological support, morbidity and
possible mortality?
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“Results: the deliberation of the Ethics Committee”
Currently, fertility specialists confronted by such scenarios
are compelled to make decisions on a case-by-case basis.
Given its complexity, the case of Patient S was brought
before the department’s Assisted Reproductive Technol-
ogy (ART) Ethics Committee. The committee includes
attending physicians, fellows, residents, a bioethicist,
embryologists, nurses, a psychiatrist, social workers, at-
torneys, and the head of the hospital IRB. Early in the
discussion, some members argued in strong support of
patient autonomy, feeling compelled to complete the
transfer of indeterminate embryos granting the couple
the ultimate decision-making power over the fate of
their embryos. Similarly, it was argued that the transfer
of an indeterminate embryo should be allowed in this
case if the couple’s primary concern was to have a child.
If the couple was willing to acknowledge and accept the
risk of having an affected child with a BRCA-1 gene,
then the transfer was acceptable.
Other members felt strongly that the transfer should
be prohibited, given that the objective of PGD was to
avoid the transmission of known deleterious genes, and
that re-biopsy and analysis of the embryo prior to transfer
should be mandatory, even though removal of more troph-
ectoderm cells might reduce the chance of the embryo
implanting. They argued that if the couple’s primary con-
cern was to have a child, regardless of that child’s carrier
status, then they should not have undergone PGD at all.
There was also significant debate about how to define
the appropriateness of transfer of indeterminate embryos
when considering different diseases. For example, mem-
bers seemed to voice stronger opinions against transfer-
ring an embryo that was a potential Tay-Sachs carrier than
one with the potential to be a BRCA-1 carrier. Members
argued that transferring an embryo possibly affected by an
immediately fatal condition would never be in the future
child’s best interest. However, when considering less de-
bilitating or non-fatal diseases, they might be more willing
to consider transfer of indeterminate embryos. No
consensus could be reached, however, regarding how
to categorize disease states as more or less debilitat-
ing; this discussion is ongoing and involves members
of the broader hospital ethics committee.
The committee concluded that the transfer of known
affected embryos should be prohibited, and that this pol-
icy be accepted by the couple prior to treatment, based
on the principle that if a patient is willing to accept an
affected embryo, then PGD is unnecessary. There was
no definitive decision regarding indeterminate embryos,
however.
What follows is an examination of the committee’s ini-
tial decision through a bioethical lens. The stakes in-
volved in this case require careful consideration of
patient autonomy, non-maleficence, justice.
Discussion part 1
Protecting patient autonomy
The couple’s request was understandable, and founded
in an intense desire for a biological child. They had
invested substantial resources to proceed with the IVF
cycle, financially, emotionally and physically. Their treat-
ment required multiple clinic visits, blood testing, and
potentially risky ovarian stimulation and oocyte retrieval.
The cost burden of infertility is significant, and often im-
pacts the decision-making process of patients undergo-
ing treatment. Moreover, undergoing IVF delayed her
prophylactic salpingo-oophorectomy, putting her at risk
of developing an ovarian malignancy. Her oncologist had
strongly encouraged her to proceed with surgery, and
recommended against a second IVF cycle to generate
more embryos. Pregnancy rates with IVF-PGD are esti-
mated to be 44–50 % [15]. Patient S thus viewed this as
her only chance at having a biological child who would
not face a medical course similar to her own.
The stakes were clearly very high for this couple. The
physician, therefore, had a great responsibility to protect
the patient’s reproductive autonomy. The couple has an
inalienable right to reproduce, parent, and create a fam-
ily. By transferring only the one unaffected embryo, and
discarding the indeterminate and affected embryos, the
patient’s chance of achieving pregnancy could have been
significantly compromised.
One might argue that the patient had alternatives to
consider, and that she could achieve future pregnancy
with a donor egg, for example. However, this patient had
a strong desire to conceive and deliver an infant that
was biologically hers, so egg donation was out of the
question. Alternatively, she could have opted to delay
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy further in order to
undergo another IVF cycle, but this was considered too
great a risk to her future health. This IVF cycle then
may very well have represented her only chance of having
a biological child; the physician’s refusal to accommodate
her wishes may have threatened her inherent right to
reproductive autonomy.
When protecting patient autonomy, it bears mention-
ing that the embryos in question are the property of the
intended parents. Therefore, one might argue the par-
ents should be the sole decision makers regarding the
fate of these embryos. If the institution that created the
embryos refuses to follow the parents’ wishes, then it is
within their right to seek care elsewhere.
Discussion part 2
Protecting the interests of the future child: non-maleficence
A second consideration is the physician’s duty towards
the future child, a duty that corresponds to the principle
of non-maleficence or “do-no-harm.” The European So-
ciety of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE)
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Task Force states: “The physician carries joint responsi-
bility for the welfare of the child because of his or her
causal and intentional contribution to the parental
project. The physician must take into account pres-
ently known risk factors for the welfare of the future
child. To avoid prejudice, arbitrariness and discrimination,
objective evidence must be sought to be able to offer good
reasons for refusing assistance” [14].
The Ethics Committee opinion on PGD from the
American Society of Reproductive Medicine references
the non-identity argument, a philosophical line of reason-
ing that argues when considering an act that results in the
creation of a life, the benefits of having any existence at
all, even if that existence is imperfect, may outweigh the
potential harm of creating a life that is flawed [16]. This
can be extrapolated to argue that it is impossible to harm
a being that has yet to exist.
Therefore, the physician must consider carefully the
wellbeing of the child he or she is helping to create. The
ESHRE Task Force comments that physicians should
only refuse to assist patients in their reproductive efforts
if “the quality of life of the future child is so low that it
would have been better off not to have been born” [14].
This statement seems intuitive, yet its inherently sub-
jective nature requires physicians to make personal judg-
ments regarding their perceived quality of life associated
with any given disease state. This is a highly subjective
task that is undeniably influenced by personal experience.
When considering disease-states, selecting against cer-
tain conditions is more intuitive than others. For example,
most people would likely select against transferring em-
bryos that may be affected by Tay-Sachs, a condition inev-
itably fatal early in life. A counter-example often referred
to in the bioethics classroom, is that of congenital deaf-
ness. Consider a deaf couple that would like to select for a
deaf child. Since deafness is largely considered a disability
in our society, in attempting to act in the best interest of
the future child a physician might refuse the parents’ re-
quest, assuming the future child would prefer to be hear-
ing rather than deaf. However, some deaf couples would
argue that deafness is not a disability. Moreover, a hearing
child might find living within a deaf community much
more challenging, and may very well feel more ostracized
than if he were deaf.
Disability rights advocates understandably take issue
with the idea of selecting against conditions that have
become labeled as disabilities. Selecting against future
children affected by Down’s syndrome, blindness, and
other inherited conditions currently defined as disabil-
ities may compromise society’s diversity, and limit our
acceptance of “otherness.” The use of PGD may risk de-
valuing certain populations.
Only approximately “three percent of American IVF-
PGD clinics report having provided PGD to couples who
seek…to select an embryo for the presence of a disabil-
ity” [17]. Again, there is no consensus on the definition
of disability. Advocates of disability rights may argue,
regardless of the label, that is it discriminatory to cat-
egorically select against all inherited conditions that fall
outside of conventional concepts of normal.
In the current case, if the indeterminate embryo pro-
duces a child that carries the BRCA-1 gene, what does
that imply for the child’s quality of life? One future adult
may feel devastated by the implications of being a carrier
of this gene, while another may find it hardly a burden
at all. Hereditary breast and ovarian cancer syndromes,
along with many other incompletely penetrative diseases,
lead to a more subtle deliberation regarding the future
child’s “best interest.” Not every BRCA-1 gene carrier
develops cancer. Of those that do develop cancer, not all
succumb to the disease. Prophylactic surgery dramatic-
ally reduces mortality. For BRCA mutation carries, a risk
reducing salpingo-oophorectomy has been shown to re-
duce ovarian cancer by 85–90 % and all cause mortality
as well [18–20]. Furthermore, given ongoing advances in
oncology research, it is possible that by the time this fu-
ture child reaches an age where he or she is at risk of
malignancy, a more effective treatment or even a cure
may have been found. Nevertheless, the threat of cancer
may be chronically distressing for these patients, espe-
cially when considering prophylactic surgeries that carry
with them a wide range of potential psychological and
physical harm [3].
When asking a physician to act in accordance with the
principle of non-maleficence towards a future child, the
difficulty lies in defining the child’s best interest. Physi-
cians must strive to consider objective measures when-
ever possible, such as extent of morbidity or mortality
associated with a certain condition, when defining a
child’s best interest.
Discussion part 3
The physician’s duty to society: justice
Considering the broader principle of justice, encompass-
ing the physician’s duty towards society at large, is also
informative. Repeated behaviors may, over time, create
medical precedents, which may eventually become ac-
cepted as standard of care. This in turn can have sub-
stantial, far-reaching public health impacts. If helping to
create a life, is it therefore justifiable to mandate that
that future life be as “healthy” as possible?
When invoking the justice argument, and questioning
the physician’s duty towards society, it becomes pertin-
ent to consider the notion of rationing: rationing of
medical care, time, and resources. An argument can be
made that the physician in our case ought to refuse to
transfer an embryo that might be a BRCA-1 carrier be-
cause that future child may require extensive clinic
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visits, mammograms, ultrasounds, and expensive surgical
interventions that could drain society’s limited resources,
and that the physician should strive to create only the
healthiest possible child.
Charging a physician with the task of helping to create
a healthy child that will not consume disproportionate
resources places a significant and unrealistic burden
upon a single individual. It asks the physician to predict
the needs of a future child, to assume the reaction of a
future society towards supporting someone with add-
itional needs, and to base clinical decisions on rationing
unquantifiable future resources. While specific genes are
increasingly becoming linked to specific disorders,
knowledge of genetic inheritance patterns and epigenetic
influence over genetic expression is still incomplete.
Though it may be medically possible to select against a
single gene or an additional chromosome in a future
child’s genome, it is beyond our reach to ensure that a
future child is free of all disease.
Perhaps the greatest argument against rationing is that
it has the potential to threaten the physician-patient re-
lationship. It can oppose the physician’s duty of benefi-
cence towards the individual patient, and to the patient’s
autonomy. Physicians are bound by oath to protect the
well-being of their patient, and in honoring that con-
tract, a physician’s duty to an individual patient’s care
may trump that of the physician’s duty towards society.
Conclusions
The approach to embryos with both known-carrier and
indeterminate-carrier status is complex. Following its
initial deliberation, the ART ethics committee requested
consultation with the larger hospital ethics committee,
which broadened the scope of participants to include
neonatologists, medical geneticists, genetic counselors,
and community members. The group agreed that, when
considering the transfer or indeterminate embryos, the
severity of illness and timing of onset of a disease-state
should guide the clinical decision. In accordance with the
ethics’ committee guidelines published by the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine, adult-onset diseases
are to be considered separately from childhood onset
diseases [16]. As discussed, it is more ethically permis-
sible to transfer embryos that are potential carriers for
BRCA-1, a gene that confers an increased risk of a po-
tentially non-fatal disease of adulthood, than it would
be to transfer potential carriers for Tay-Sachs, a uni-
formly fatal disease of infancy. As outlined in the
ASRM guidelines the central involvement of a genetics
counselor in pre-testing planning can be extremely use-
ful, and should be encouraged in these cases [16].
Although our ethics committee initially moved to pro-
hibit the transfer of affected embryos, after further delib-
eration, this prohibition was found to be too stringent,
without allowing for considerations within specific cir-
cumstances. The committee is currently creating a list of
disease states in which it would recommend against the
transfer of known affected embryos, which will be
shared with patients.
Bringing ethical quandaries before an ethics committee
relieves the burden of decision-making from the individ-
ual physician. However, the opinion of such a committee
should not be a surrogate for the counseling that is an
inherent part of the physician-patient relationship. While
the discussion amongst professionals from different
backgrounds and different areas of expertise can be en-
lightening, it can also over-shadow the essential role of
the one-on-one relationship between a patient and her
physician. The personal, therapeutic relationship be-
tween physician and patient will always foster a richer,
more intricate, more subtle conversation than that had
amongst a large group of people unknown to the patient
herself. A benefit of this relationship is the ability to con-
duct an in depth informed consent process, specifically
outlining all possible results. The physician can take this
opportunity to create a plan with the patient regarding
how to act in the case of indeterminate, affected, or non-
diagnostic embryos. Prior to ART, the policies of the phys-
ician and/or clinic should be made available in writing.
Ultimately, in the case of Patient S, the physician met
with the couple who agreed to proceed with transfer of
the single unaffected embryo, and successfully con-
ceived. She delivered a male infant weighing 4309 g at
40.7 weeks gestational age. The inconclusive embryos
have not been re-biopsied.
As IVF and PGD become more available, greater con-
sideration and guidance over what to do in such cases is
necessary. Physicians should decide with their patients
on a plan of action in advance if PGD results are
inconclusive.
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